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Abstract
We consider the problem of deriving optimal marketing policies for the spread of innova-
tions in a social network. We seek to compute policies that account for i) endogenous network
inﬂuences, ii) the presence of competitive ﬁrms, that also wish to inﬂuence the network, and
iii) possible uncertainties in the network model. Contrary to prior work in optimal advertising,
which also accounts for network inﬂuences, we assume a dynamical model of preferences and
we compute optimal policies for either a ﬁnite or inﬁnite horizon. The optimal policies are
related to and extend priorly introduced notions of centrality measures usually considered in
sociology. We also compute robust optimal policies for the case of misspeciﬁed dynamics or
uncertainties which can be modeled as external disturbances of the nominal dynamics. We
show that the optimization exhibits a certainty equivalence property, i.e., the optimal values of
the control variables are the same as if there were no uncertainty. Finally, we investigate the
scenario where a competitive ﬁrm also tries to inﬂuence the network. In this case, robust opti-
mal solutions are computed in the form of i) Nash and Stackelberg solutions, and ii) max-min
solutions.
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the derivation of optimal marketing strategies in a social network of
customers whose preferences are affected by both their neighbors’ preferences and the incentives
provided through advertising. Similar questions appear in different formulations, for example,
the adoption of dominant strategies in a network of strategic players (Ellison 1993, Young 2001,
∗This work was supported by AFOSR projects #FA9550-05-1-0321 and #FA9550-09-1-0420. G.C. Chasparis is
supported by the Swedish Research Council through the Linnaeus Center LCCC.
†G.C. Chasparis is with the Department of Automatic Control, Lund University, Lund 221 00-SE, Sweden. E-
mail: georgios.chasparis@control.lth.se. URL: http://www.control.lth.se/chasparis.
‡J.S. Shammais with theSchoolof ElectricalandComputerEngineering,GeorgiaInstitute ofTechnology,Atlanta,
GA 30332. E-mail: shamma@gatech.edu. URL: http://www.prism.gatech.edu/∼jshamma3.
1Jackson and Watts 2002), the convergence of beliefs in a social network (Golub and Jackson 2007)
or the inﬂuence of word-of-mouth communication in the adoption of new products (Alkemade and
Castaldi 2005, Dubey et al. 2006). In all these formulations, the question remains the same, that is:
what is the groupof agents that we should target so that themaximum cascade of further inﬂuences
results?
This work is closely related to the literature on optimal advertising starting with (Vidale and
Wolfe1957)inamonopolyframeworkandithasbeenextendedtodifferentialgamesinoligopolies,
a detailed survey of which can be found in (Jørgensen and Zaccour 2004). The main objective of
this line of work, as very well stated in (Sethi 1977), is to set up an optimal control problem to
determine the optimal rate of advertising expenditures over time in a way that maximizes the net
proﬁt of the ﬁrm. To this end, prior work has focused on i) the derivation of dynamic models
which capture the sales response to advertising, and ii) the computation of an optimal policy of
advertising as a function of the sales.
Thosemodelswhichcapturetheeffect ofadvertisingonsalesareusuallydescribedbymeans of
a differential or difference equation which describes the evolution of the state (sales rate or market
share) as a function of the state and the advertising expenditures. We will assume that ﬁrms have
some way of knowing or estimating the dynamics of sales response to advertising. The estimation
of these dynamics will not be part of this work. Moreover, several sales-to-advertising models are
also a function of other properties, such as price or quality, which will not be considered here.
Prior sales-to-advertising models usually capture the following phenomena: i) advertising ef-
fects persist over the current period but diminish with time (Vidale and Wolfe 1957), ii) marginal
advertising effects diminish or remain constant with the size of advertising (Leitmann and Schmi-
tendorf 1978), iii) advertising effects diminish with the size of sales (Vidale and Wolfe 1957, Case
1979, Deal 1979), iv) advertising effects diminish with the size of competitive advertising (Deal
and Zionts 1973, Case 1979, Erickson 1985, 1992, Chintagunta and Vilcassim 1992, Fruchter and
Kalish 1997), and v) advertising effects are affected by word-of-mouth communication (or excess
advertising) (Jørgensen 1982).
Depending on the formulation of sales response to advertising, models have also been catego-
rized in: i) sales response models (where the state is the rate of sales) (Vidale and Wolfe 1957), ii)
market share models (where the state is the share of the market) (Case 1979), iii) diffusion mod-
els (which capture the market growth) (Bass 1969), and iv) goodwill models (which capture the
evolution of advertising capital) (Nerlove and Arrow 1962).
Our model is also related to those models. It exhibits diminishing returns with time in the
absence of advertising effort, constant marginal returns with the size of advertising, and dimin-
ishing returns with the size of competitive advertising. It extends traditional advertising models
by also considering the effect of word-of-mouth communication through a network of interactions
similarly to (Alkemade and Castaldi 2005, Dubey et al. 2006). However, the analysis here is not
restricted to the equilibrium state of the evolutionof preferences. Instead, the dynamics of network
2effects become part of the optimization. Using this model, we are able to derive analytically opti-
mal advertising strategies which are related to and extend priorly introduced notions of centrality
measures usually considered in sociology (Bonacich 1987).
Due to the inclusion of network interactions in the derivation of the optimal marketing strategy,
this work is also related to the diffusion of innovations and cascading phenomena in social net-
works (Domingos and Richardson 2001, Richardson and Domingos 2002, Goldenberg et al. 2001,
Kempe et al. 2003). In such models, each customer may purchase the marketed product with a
probability that depends on the neighbors’ probabilities of purchasing the product. Then, the opti-
mal marketing plan can be derived based on the expected increase in proﬁt that this marketing plan
incurs. Of course, the computation of such optimal marketing plan will depend on the amount of
inﬂuence each customer has on its neighbors, a notion that is usually termed as the network value
of a customer (Richardson and Domingos 2002). Several other models of interactions have been
proposed including the linear threshold model motivated by (Schelling 1978, Granovetter 1978),
where nodes become activated if the number of activated neighbors exceeds a threshold. Another
model of interactions is the independent cascade model of (Goldenberg et al. 2001), where, once
a node is activated, it is given the chance to activate its neighbors, while its success depends on
a probability distribution which is independent for each node. One characteristic of these mod-
els is the computational complexity of computing the set of nodes that, if targeted, will incur the
largest possible inﬂuence in the network of customers. Furthermore, it is assumed that there is a
unique seller who is trying to inﬂuence the network, ignoring this way the potential effect that a
competitive seller may have on its sales.
Due to the complexity resulting from the inclusion of network interactions, the computation of
the optimal policy of a ﬁrm might be challenging. For example, (Kempe et al. 2003) deals with the
algorithmic question posed by (Domingos and Richardson 2001) on how we should select the set
of nodes that will cause the largest possible inﬂuence in the population. In fact, an approximation
algorithm is proposed, based on the submodularity property of the inﬂuence function and in the
context of the linear threshold model of (Schelling 1978, Granovetter 1978) and the independent
cascade model of (Goldenberg et al. 2001), that computes the optimal set of nodes with a perfor-
mance guarantee of 63%. A similar algorithmic approximation is derived by (Bharathi et al. 2007)
for the computation of best responses in the presence of multiple ﬁrms (innovations) under the
framework of (Goldenberg et al. 2001).
For the study of competition when multiple ﬁrms are present, a game theoretic model is pro-
posed by (Goyal and Kearns 2011). According to this model, two ﬁrms are competing for the
diffusion of innovations in a given network, where diffusion follows a form of threshold dynam-
ics similar to (Granovetter 1978). (Goyal and Kearns 2011) is dealing with the computation of
upper bounds of the price of anarchy, and how network structure may amplify the initial budget
differences. A similar network diffusion model has also been considered by (Fazeli and Jadbabaie
2012), where nodes update their preferences upon arrival of a Poisson clock and according to the
3payoffs received by playing a coordination game with their neighbors. Furthermore, Nash equilib-
ria are computed for the strategic interaction between the two ﬁrms assuming the smallest possible
adoption for each strategy.
Thispaperisalsoconcerned withthecomputationofoptimalmarketingpoliciesinthepresence
of word-of-mouth communication (due to the network structure) and multiple ﬁrms. Its contribu-
tion, which distinguishes it from prior literature, lies in the combination of three important factors
i) dynamic network effects in the formation of preferences which are included in the optimization,
ii) misspeciﬁcations/uncertainties in the assumed model of evolution of preferences, and iii) un-
certainty in the intentions of a competitive ﬁrm that also tries to inﬂuence the network. Although
network inﬂuences in the formation of preferences are present in several models, the optimization
is usually performed at steady-state, e.g., (Goyal and Kearns 2011) or (Fazeli and Jadbabaie 2012).
Here, instead the dynamics of preferences become part of the optimization. Furthermore, although
uncertainties due to the presence of a competitive ﬁrm might be taken into account in several mod-
els, we would like to also compute optimal marketing policies under the presence of uncertainties
in the network structure. Usually stochastic extensions of existing models have been considered,
e.g., (Sethi 1983,Prasad and Sethi 2004). In this paper, we would liketo consideruncertainties that
can incorporate possible unmodeled dynamics. Under these perturbed dynamics, we formulate a
max-min optimization to compute an optimal policy which is robust to a class of norm-bounded
uncertainties. We show that the optimization exhibits a certainty equivalence property, that is, the
optimal values of the control variables are the same as if there were no uncertainty.
Finally, we investigatethe possibilitythat a competitiveﬁrm also tries to inﬂuence the network,
introducing a second form of uncertainty. In this case, and when the objective of the competitive
ﬁrm is to maximize its sales, the strategy of the competitive ﬁrm may not be known. We will
either assume that i) the competitive ﬁrm is a competitive fridge which tries to enter the market,
introducing a notion of sequential optimization (expressed by a Stackelberg solution), or ii) both
ﬁrms have the ability of simultaneous play (expressed by a Nash solution). Under these scenar-
ios, we provide a complete characterization of open-loop Nash and Stackelberg solutions. These
solutions are also a subset of closed-loop (or Markovian) Nash solutions. A complete characteri-
zation of the set of closed-loop Nash solutions is going beyond the scope of this paper, since it is
highly case-dependent, i.e., it depends on the class of policies which will be considered reasonable
for the scenario of interest. However, the proposed framework can easily be utilized to provide
closed-loop Nash solutions for a speciﬁed class of policies. Finally, we investigate the scenario
where ﬁrms are also uncertain about the objectives of the competitor, which can be formulated as
a max-min optimization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the problem under
consideration. Section 3 discusses some necessary background on dynamic programming. Sec-
tion 4 derives ﬁnite- and inﬁnite-horizon optimal policies in a monopoly under unperturbed and
perturbed preferences’ update. Section 5 computes Stackelberg and Nash solutions in a duopoly.
4Finally, Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
Notation: For any vector x ∈ Rn, where xi is its ith entry,
− |x| denotes its Euclidean norm,
− |x|∞ , max{|x1|,...,|xn|},
− max
+
1 (x) , max{0,x1,x2,...,xn},
− max
+
i (x) , max
 
{0,x1,x2,...,xn}\
 i−1
k=1max
+
k (x)
 
, i > 1,
− for some α > 0, sat(x;α) , (y1,y2,...,yn) such that
yi =

  
  
α xi ≥ α
xi 0 < xi < α
0 xi ≤ 0
, i = 1,2,...,n.
2 Problem Description
2.1 Evolution of preferences
The problem considers a pair of ﬁrms L = {a,b} and a ﬁnite set of customers or nodes I =
{1,2,...,n}.1 We will denote a ﬁrm by ℓ ∈ L and a customer by i ∈ I. Although we assume that
nodes represent customers, we may also consider the case where a node i ∈ I represents a group
of customers with similar characteristics. Nodes are connected through a directed network whose
links are described by a row stochastic matrix W.2 The matrix W captures how nodes’ proclivities
towards the product of either ﬁrm a or ﬁrm b are affected by its neighbors.
Let xℓ
i,k ≥ 0 be the proclivity of node i towards buying the product of ﬁrm ℓ ∈ {a,b} at time k,
and xℓ
k , (xℓ
1,k,xℓ
2,k,...,xℓ
n,k) ∈ Rn
+ be the vector of proclivities over the whole network. We will
refer to this vector as the state of ﬁrm ℓ and we will denote by Sℓ ⊂ Rn
+ the corresponding set of
states.
Firm ℓ ∈ L is able to inﬂuence the proclivity of node i ∈ I towards its product by marketing its
productto nodei, e.g., by offeringdiscountsorwarranties. Let uℓ
i,k ≥ 0 denotetheamountoffunds
that ﬁrm ℓ spends on marketing its product to node i at time k, and uℓ
k , (uℓ
1,k,uℓ
2,k,...,uℓ
n,k) ∈ Rn
+
be the vector of funds ﬁrm ℓ spends over the set of nodes I. We will refer to this quantity as the
1An extension of the forthcoming analysis to multiple number of ﬁrms will be straightforward.
2A row stochastic matrix W is a nonnegativematrix which also satisﬁes W1 = 1, i.e., the sum of its entries in any
row is equal to 1.
5control of ﬁrm ℓ. We will assume that the amount of funds each ﬁrm can spend at any given time
cannot be larger than Mℓ, i.e.,
 
i∈I
u
ℓ
i,k ≤ M
ℓ for all k = 0,1,.... (1)
Let Cℓ ⊂ Rn
+ denote the resulting constraint set of controls.
The speciﬁc relation between the controls and the states is motivated by the work of (Dubey
et al. 2006, Friedkin 2001) on social inﬂuence network theory and it is described by the following
difference equation:
x
ℓ
k+1 = ΘWx
ℓ
k + (I − Θ)ϕ(u
ℓ
k,u
−ℓ
k ) (2)
which provides the proclivity of node i at time k + 1 as a convex combination of i) a weighted
average of the proclivities of the neighbors and ii) the external inﬂuence caused by both own and
competitive advertising. The notation −ℓ denotes the complementary set L\ℓ. The matrix Θ
satisﬁes:
Θ = diag{θ1,θ2,...,θn}, 0 ≤ θi < 1, ∀i ∈ I. (3)
The constraint (3) has a natural interpretation since it implies that there is no node that completely
ignores external inﬂuence. Furthermore, in the absence of external inﬂuence, it also models dimin-
ishing returns with time. We will simplify notation by rewriting the dynamics in the form:
x
ℓ
k+1 = Ax
ℓ
k + Bϕ(u
ℓ
k,u
−ℓ
k ), (4)
where A , ΘW and B , I − Θ. Variations of this nominal model will also be considered later
on in this paper when ﬁrms are uncertain about the accuracy of the model.
The function ϕ : Cℓ × C−ℓ → [0,α1] × ... × [0,αn], for some αi > 0, i ∈ I, maps the
control vectors of both ﬁrms to a vector of inﬂuences over the set of nodes I. It is assumed to be
nonnegativeand bounded above. We will refer to this function as the inﬂuence function. We would
like function ϕ to also satisfy:
Assumption 1 The inﬂuence function ϕ : Cℓ × C−ℓ → [0,α1] × ... × [0,αn], for some αi > 0,
i ∈ I, is such that:
1. ϕi(uℓ
k,u
−ℓ
k ) ≥ 0, if uℓ
i,k ≥ u
−ℓ
i,k;
2. ϕi(uℓ
k,u
−ℓ
k ) = 0, if uℓ
i,k < u
−ℓ
i,k.
That is, a customer would be inﬂuenced towards either one of the ﬁrms depending on the relative
size of their advertising. One candidate function which satisﬁes the above property is:
ϕi(u
ℓ
k,u
−ℓ
k ) , sat(u
ℓ
i,k − u
−ℓ
i,k;αi) (5)
6for some αi > 0, i = 1,2,...,n.
We will refer to the above model as duopoly. When, instead, u
−ℓ
i,k ≡ 0 for all i ∈ I and
k = 0,1,..., we will refer to this model as monopoly.
The proposed update of preferences exhibits constant marginal returns with the size of own
advertising and diminishing returns with the size of competitive advertising, which is due to the
deﬁnition of the inﬂuence function. It also exhibits diminishing returns with time, due to the
deﬁnition of the matrix Θ. Finally, it models the effect of word-of-mouth (or excess) advertising
due to the assumed network of connections.
2.2 Objective
The utility of ﬁrm ℓ ∈ L at time k is deﬁned as:
g(x
ℓ
k,u
ℓ
k) = V (x
ℓ
k) − C(u
ℓ
k) (6)
whereweassumethatthereward islinearwiththeproclivitiesofthenodes, i.e., V (xℓ
k) = vTxℓ
k,for
some vector v ∈ Rn
+, and the cost is linear with the funds spent on advertising, i.e., C(uℓ
k) = cTuℓ
k,
for some c ∈ Rn
+.
For some discount factor β ∈ (0,1), the objective of ﬁrm ℓ has the following form
max
πℓ∈Πℓ
 
Jπℓ(x) , lim
N→∞
N−1  
k=0
β
kg(x
ℓ
k, 
ℓ
k(x
ℓ
k))
 
(7)
over the set of inﬁnite sequences of policies Πℓ with elements πℓ = ( ℓ
0, ℓ
1,...) where  ℓ
k is a
function from the set of states S to the set of controls C. The above optimization is subject to the
dynamics (4). Later on, we are also going to consider variations of this optimization, especially
when dynamics (4) are perturbed and robust optimal policies need to be derived.
For the remainder of the paper, the proposed advertisingmodel characterized by the dynamics
(4) and the utility function (6) will be denoted by M.
2.3 Assumptions and preliminaries
For the remainder of the paper, we are going to consider the following assumptions:
Assumption 2 βvTB − cT > 0.
That is, βvi(1−θi)−ci > 0, i = 1,2,...,n, i.e., for every unit of advertising effort, the discounted
return of each node is strictlygreater than the corresponding cost. This is a reasonable assumption
and it is also related to the existence of a non-degenerate solution to the optimization problems
considered herein.
7Assumption 3 αℓ
i ≥ Mℓ
i for all i ∈ I and ℓ ∈ L.
This assumption implies that each node’s capacity of getting inﬂuenced through advertising is
larger than the advertising power of each ﬁrm. This is not a necessary assumption for the existence
of solutions, however, it simpliﬁes the following analysis. The derivation of the corresponding
solutions in case Assumption 3 does not hold is also straightforward and qualitatively remains
identical.
In thepresentationofthemodel, wehaveimplicitlyassumedthat theevolutionofpreferences is
governedbyidenticaldynamicsforbothﬁrms. Thisassumptionallowsforacleanerpresentationof
theanalysis, however, as it willbecome obviouslater, it does not change qualitativelythe solutions.
We also assume that the utility functions of both ﬁrms are of the same form. This implies that
beneﬁts and costs are materialized as a function of the proclivities and investments similarly for
bothﬁrms. This is areasonable assumption,however,the followinganalysiscan beeasily modiﬁed
to include the case of different utility functions.
Note, ﬁnally, that the proposed dynamics (4) constitute a linear time-invariant system with
bounded inputs. It is straightforward to show that the above system is input-output stable in the
sense that there exist nonnegative constants ζ, θ such that the solution to the difference equation,
denoted x(k,x0,u), satisﬁes |x(k,x0,u)| ≤ ζ +θ u ∞, where  u ∞ , sup{|uk| : k ∈ Z+}. This
is due to the fact that W is a row stochastic matrix and Θ satisﬁes the constraint (3). The constraint
(3) on matrix Θ also implies the controllability (cf., (Kailath 1980)) of the system (A,B), simply
because rank(B) = rank(I − Θ) = n.
2.4 Alternative models and discussion
The dynamics (4) are based on the assumption that agents are bounded rational, since their pref-
erences are a weighted average of neighbors’ preferences. Full rationality instead may not neces-
sarily lead to better models due to the resulting computational complexity. A similar model in the
context of evolution of preferences without external inﬂuence has also been considered by (Fried-
kin and Johnsen 1999, Golub and Jackson 2007) to study the diffusion of innovations and norms in
a social network. This model has also been related to alternative measures of centrality (Bonacich
1987, Friedkin 1991).
In this paper, we modiﬁed the model used by (Friedkin and Johnsen 1999, Golub and Jackson
2007) to include the possibility of an external control inﬂuence (4), e.g., due to advertising effects.
The proposed model bears similarities with several previously introduced advertising models, e.g.,
the goodwill models of (Nerlove and Arrow 1962), new product diffusion models (Bass 1969) or
extensions of the Vidale-Wolfe model (Vidale and Wolfe 1957). In the following subsections we
discuss some of the similarities and differences between these models with the proposed M.
82.4.1 Comparison with goodwill models
Advertising goodwill models (see, e.g., (Jørgensen and Zaccour 2004, Section 3.5)) capture the
evolution of the advertising capital. For example, the advertising goodwill model introduced in the
seminal paper (Nerlove and Arrow 1962) assumes the following dynamics
˙ G(t) = u(t) − δG(t), (8a)
where G(t) represents the advertising capital. The main difference with the proposed model M is
that the latter includes directly the interpersonal inﬂuences through the assumed communication
network, thus modeling a form of word-of-mouth communication. Note also that the control input
or advertising effort u inﬂuences directly the advertising capital. Similar is the assumption in M,
where the advertising effort directly inﬂuences the preferences of all nodes. This is not necessarily
the case in other advertising models, where the advertisingeffort only applies to the undecided part
of the population.
The dynamics (8a) can also be modiﬁed to include the possibility of multiple ﬁrms, e.g., the
models in (Fershtman 1984, Chintagunta 1993). For example, the model considered in (Chinta-
gunta 1993) assumes
˙ Gi(t) =
 
ui(t) − δGi(t), Gi(0) = Gi0 > 0, i ∈ {1,2}, (8b)
and the sales rate xi (similarly to the proposed vector of proclivities) depends on the advertising
capital of both ﬁrms, i.e., xi = xi(G1,G2), where ∂xi/∂Gi > 0 and ∂xi/∂Gj < 0 for i  = j.
Note that the square root of the control input in (8b), which has also been used in other ad-
vertising models (see, e.g., (Case 1979)), captures diminishing marginal returns with the size of
advertising effort. Alternatively, diminishing marginal returns can also be modeled indirectly by
considering a squared cost in the utility function. For example, in (Deal 1979) the term u2
i is con-
sidered instead in the cost function, or in (Gould 1970) more general non-linear functions of ui
are considered which are convex increasing. In M, instead, diminishing/constant marginal returns
with the advertising effort are modeled indirectly by assuming the saturation effect in the inﬂuence
function.
A squared cost term in the utilityfunction could also have been included in the proposed model
M. For example, an alternativeutility function that incorporates diminishingmarginal returns with
the size of advertising could be:
g(x
ℓ
k,u
ℓ
k) = v
Tx
ℓ
k −
 
u
ℓ
k
 TCu
ℓ
k (9)
whereC , diag(c), i.e., C is a diagonal matrix where thediagonal entries coincidewith theentries
of the vector c. Some of the nice analytical properties of M are also shared by the above quadratic
cost function (9), such as the forthcoming analytical solution of the monopoly optimization prob-
9lem.
2.4.2 Comparison with market-share response models
The goodwill advertising models and the proposed model M differ from market-share response
models emanating from the model of Vidale-Wolfe, (Vidale and Wolfe 1957). An extension of this
model to a duopoly has been considered by (Deal and Zionts 1973):
˙ xi = (1 − xi − xj)ui − δixi, xi(0) = xi0, (10a)
for all i,j ∈ {1,2}, i  = j, and for some constants {δi}. A small modiﬁcation (Deal et al. 1979)
can also account for excess advertising effects due to word-of-mouth inﬂuences in the population,
e.g.,
˙ xi = (1 − xi − xj)ui − δixi + ei(ui − uj)(xi + xj), xi(0) = xi0, (10b)
for all i,j ∈ {1,2}, i  = j, and for constants{ei}, where the last term represents the word-of-mouth
switching from j to i.
Contrary to both M and the goodwill advertising models, where the advertising effort applies
directly to the whole population, in the market-share response generalizations of Vidale-Wolfe’s
model (Vidale and Wolfe 1957), the control applies only to the undecided part of the population.
The last term of the dynamics (10b), which models excess advertising, applies to the decided part
of the market and models transfers due to excess of advertising. This term also resembles the
inﬂuence function ϕ considered in M, where the inﬂuence on a node depends only on the excess
part of the advertising efforts at that node.
Note, however, that a small modiﬁcation of M can account for behaviors that are present in the
market-share models (Vidale and Wolfe 1957). For example, if we instead consider the inﬂuence
function:
ϕi(u
ℓ
k,u
−ℓ
k ) , diag
 
α
ℓ1 − x
−ℓ
k
 
u
ℓ − diag
 
α
ℓ1 − x
ℓ
k
 
u
−ℓ, (11)
then the advertising efforts of either ﬁrm applies only on the part of the market which is either
undecided or has different preferences. When we assume the alternative dynamics with the inﬂu-
ence function (11), then an analytical derivation of a closed-form solution, even for the monopoly
framework, is not feasible any more. In the forthcoming analysis, we will only consider the ini-
tiallyproposed inﬂuence function which provides closed-form solutions, howeverfuture work may
include alternative forms of the inﬂuence function that may accept only numerical solutions.
Similarremarksalsoholdforthemodelsemanatingfrom theLanchastermodelofcombat, such
as the models of (Kimball 1957, Erickson 1985, 1992, Chintagunta and Vilcassim 1992, Fruchter
and Kalish 1997). The main difference of Lanchester models with the Vidale-Wolfe models is that
in the latter ones the effect of competitive advertising onto the market share is indirectly included
(through the undecided portion of the market). Instead, in the Lanchester models, the effect of
10competitive advertising is directly included in the dynamics of market share.
This discussion reveals the ﬂexibility of the proposed model M to incorporate alternative be-
haviors or modeling ideas which have already been discussed in prior literature. In several cases
though, it is desirable that a sales-to-advertising model also provides closed-form solutions. The
proposed model M and its extensions herein exhibit most of the observed phenomena of sales-to-
advertising models and, as we will discuss later, it provides attractive closed-form expressions of
optimal strategies under several scenarios.
3 Dynamic Programming Background
The notation and part of the analysis in this section follows (Bertsekas and Shreve 1978).
3.1 The dynamic programming algorithm
Denote by J the set of all extended real-valued functions of the form J : S → R∗, deﬁned on the
state space S and taking values on the extended real line R∗ = [−∞,+∞].
For some time horizon N ∈ N, consider the generic ﬁnite-horizon optimization problem:
max
π∈Π
 
JN,π(x0) , E
 
g(xN) +
N−1  
k=0
β
kg(xk, k,wk)
  
(12)
over any admissible policy π = { 0, 1,..., N−1} ∈ Π, where  k ∈ M for all k, and M is the set
of functions from the set of states S to the set of controls C. Furthermore, g(xN) deﬁnes the cost
at the ﬁnal stage, which depends only on the ﬁnal state xN.
The above optimization is subject to the system dynamics xk+1 = f(xk,uk,wk), where {wk}
denotes a noise sequence taking values in a measurable space (W,F). Denote J∗
N(x) the optimal
value of the N-stage objective function. Finally, assume that |g(x,u,w)| < ∞, for all x ∈ S,
u ∈ C, and w ∈ W.
For any function J ∈ J, deﬁne the following function
(TJ)(x) , max
u∈C(x)
E{g(x,u,w) + βJ(f(x,u,w))}, x ∈ S.
Note that (TJ)( ) is the optimal value function for the one stage problem that has stage cost g and
terminal cost βJ.
Also, we will denote by T k the composition of the mapping T with itself k times; i.e., for all
k = 1,2,..., we write
(T
kJ)(x) = (T(T
k−1J))(x), x ∈ S.
For convenience, we also write (T 0J)(x) = J(x).
11Similarly, for any function J ∈ J and any policy   : S → C, we denote:
(T J)(x) , E{g(x, (x),w) + βJ(f(x, (x),w))}. (13)
Again, T J may be viewed as the cost function associated with the policy   for the one-stage
problem that has stage cost g and terminal cost βJ.
The dynamic programming algorithm (DP) is the following algorithm; for any k = 1,...,N
compute
Jk(x) = (TJk−1)(x), (14)
with initial condition J0(x) = g(x). The last step of the DP algorithm provides the N-stage value,
JN(x), x ∈ S.
Deﬁne
H(x,u,J) , E {g(x,u,w) + βJ(f(x,u,w))}. (15)
Assumption 4 Theabovesequence{Jk} ⊂ J isanon-decreasingsequencesatisfyingH(x,u,J1) <
∞, and
lim
k→∞
H(x,u,Jk) = H(x,u, lim
k→∞
Jk),
for all x ∈ S and u ∈ C.
The above assumption excludes problems where exchangeability of expectation with the limit
isnot possible. Thisassumptionis satisﬁed when weconsideramonotonouslyincreasingsequence
of functions {Jk} in J and also the functions Jk are measurable with respect to the probability
measure under consideration. This will be due to the Lebesgue’s Increasing Convergence Theorem
(cf., (Jones 1993)).
Proposition 1 (Optimality of DP) Let Assumption 4 hold, and assume that Jk,π(x) < ∞ for all
x ∈ S, π ∈ Π, and k = 1,2,...,N. Then, J∗
N = T N(J0).
Proof. See Proposition 3.1 in (Bertsekas and Shreve 1978).
3.2 Inﬁnite horizon problems
Consider now the inﬁnite horizon optimization problem:
max
π∈Π
 
Jπ(x0) = lim
N→∞
E
 
N−1  
k=0
β
kg(xk, k(xk),wk)
  
, (16)
over any admissible inﬁnite policy π = { 0, 1,...} and subject to the system dynamics xk+1 =
f(x,u,w). Let also deﬁne the optimal value of this problem as J∗(x) , supπ∈Π Jπ(x).
The following is a condition on the optimal stationary policy.
12Proposition 2 (Optimal stationary policy) Consider the inﬁnite horizon optimizationproblem of
(16) and assume that J0(x) ≤ H(x,u,J0) for all x ∈ S and u ∈ C where J0(x) = g(x). Then,
the optimal value of the inﬁnite horizon optimization problem is J∗(x) = limN→∞ JN(x), where
JN(x) is the N-th stage value of the dynamic programmingalgorithm. Let also Assumption4 hold.
Then, a stationary policy π∗ = ( ∗, ∗,...) ∈ Π is optimal if and only if
T ∗(Jπ∗) = T(Jπ∗). (17)
Proof. See Proposition 5.5 in (Bertsekas and Shreve 1978).
4 Optimal Policy in Monopoly
In this section, we compute the optimal policy of a ﬁrm when there is no competitiveﬁrm, and also
the dynamics are either a) unperturbed, or b) perturbed. Since we consider a single ﬁrm, we will
skip the superscript ℓ for the remainder of this section.
4.1 Unperturbed dynamics
The dynamics we consider in this section are described by (4) with u
−ℓ
k ≡ 0, i.e.,
xk+1 = Axk + Bϕ(uk) , f(xk,uk). (18)
In the remainder of this section, we compute the optimal policy for the 1) ﬁnite-horizon, and 2)
inﬁnite-horizon optimization problem.
First, deﬁne: ˜ Ak ,
 k
j=0βjAj and hT
k+1 , βvT ˜ AkB − cT, for k = 0,1,.... Note that ˜ A0 = I
and hT
1 = βvTB − cT.
Before computing the solutions to the ﬁnite- and inﬁnite-horizon optimization problems, note
that:
Claim 1 vT ˜ Ak+1 ≥ vT ˜ Ak for all k = 0,1,....
Proof. First note that
v
T ˜ Ak+1 = v
T
k+1  
j=0
β
jA
j
= v
T
k  
j=0
β
jA
j + v
Tβ
k+1A
k+1 ≥ v
T ˜ Ak.
where the last inequality results from the fact that all the entries of matrix A are nonnegative.
134.1.1 Finite-horizon optimization
We ﬁrst consider the ﬁnite-horizon optimization
max
π∈Π
 
Jπ(x0) , g(xN) +
N−1  
k=0
β
kg(xk, k(xk))
 
. (19)
where g(x) , vTx deﬁnes the utility at the last stage.
Proposition 3 (N-th stage optimal policy) Consider the ﬁnite horizon optimizationproblem (19)
under the dynamics (18). The Nth stage optimal value of the dynamic programming iteration, is
J
∗
N(x) = v
T ˜ ANx +
N−1  
k=0
β
kh
T
N−ku
∗
N−k. (20)
The optimal control at time k, for k = 0,1,...,N − 1, is u∗
N−k = (u∗
1,N−k,...,u∗
n,N−k), where
u
∗
i,N−k =
 
M i = argmax
+
1 (hN−k)
0 otherwise.
(21)
Proof. We are going to show the statement by induction. According to the dynamic programming
algorithm, the k-th stage optimal value is
Jk(x) = max
uk∈C(x)
{g(x,uk) + βJk−1(f(x,uk))}
where J0(x) = g(x) = vTx. By applying the operator T to J0, we get the optimal value for the
ﬁrst stage, which is
J1(x) = max
u1∈C(x)
{g(x,u1) + βJ0(f(x,u1))}
= max
u1∈C(x)
 
(v
T + βv
TA)x + (βv
TB − c
T)u1
 
= v
T ˜ A1x + h
T
1u
∗
1.
where the optimal stage control is u∗
1 = (u∗
1,1,...,u∗
n,1) such that
u
∗
i,1 =
 
M i = argmax
+
1 (h1)
0 otherwise.
(22)
Note that the value J1( ) is given by expression (20) if we set N = 1 and the optimal stage control
u∗
1 is given by expression (21) if we set N = 1 and k = 0.
14Assume that the value iteration for the N-step optimization horizon gives (20), i.e.,
JN(x) = v
T ˜ ANx +
N−1  
k=0
β
kh
T
N−ku
∗
N−k (23)
where u∗
N−k = (u∗
1,N−k,...,u∗
n,N−k) is such that
u
∗
i,N−k =
 
M i = argmax
+
1 (hN−k)
0 otherwise,
for k = 0,1,...,N − 1.
Consider now an (N + 1)-step optimization horizon. The value at (N + 1) is:
JN+1(x) = (TJN)(x)
= max
uN+1∈C
{g(x,uN+1) + βJN(f(x,uN+1))}
= v
T
 
I + β ˜ ANA
 
x + max
uN+1∈C
h
T
N+1uN+1 + β
N−1  
k=0
β
kh
T
N−ku
∗
N−k
= v
T
 
I + β ˜ ANA
 
x + h
T
N+1u
∗
N+1 + β
N−1  
k=0
β
kh
T
N−ku
∗
N−k
= v
T ˜ Ak+1x +
k+1  
i=1
β
i
 
βv
TB ˜ Ak−i+1 − c
T
 
u
∗
k−i+1 (24)
where u∗
N+1 = (u∗
1,N+1,...,u∗
n,N+1) is such that
u
∗
i,N+1 =
 
M i = argmax
+
1 (hN+1)
0 otherwise,
(25)
for i = 1,2,...,n. Thus, we showed that the values of the dynamic programming iteration are
provided by equation (20).
Finally, to show optimalityof the dynamicprogramming iteration, subtract equations (23) from
(24) to get:
JN+1(x) − JN(x) = v
T
 
˜ AN+1 − ˜ AN
 
x+
N−1  
k=0
β
k  
h
T
N+1−ku
∗
N+1−k − h
T
N−ku
∗
N−k
 
+ β
Nh
T
1 u
∗
1.
15By Claim 1, we have that vT
 
˜ AN+1 − ˜ AN
 
x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ S. By Assumption 2 and (25), we
also have
h
T
N+1u
∗
N+1 ≥ h
T
Nu
∗
N ≥ ... ≥ h
T
1u
∗
1 > 0.
Therefore, JN+1(x) ≥ JN(x) for all x ∈ S and Assumption 4 is satisﬁed. Then, by Propo-
sition 1, the dynamic programming iteration provides the optimal value of the ﬁnite-horizon opti-
mization (19).
The optimal marketing strategy given by (21) is a consequence of Assumption 3. As already
pointed out, the corresponding optimal strategy when Assumption 3 does not hold qualitatively
remains identical. In particular, it is straightforward to check that, in this case, the optimal control
at time k will suggest that we should split the marketing resources among the largest entries of hk,
i.e., the maximum entry receives the largest share, the second maximum entry receives the largest
share out of the remaining resources and so forth.
4.1.2 Inﬁnite-horizon optimization
We would like to solve the following optimization problem:
max
π∈Π
 
Jπ(x0) , lim
N→∞
N−1  
k=0
β
kg(xk, k(xk))
 
(26)
subject to the discrete-time dynamics (18). First recall the deﬁnition of H(x,u,J) from (15).
Given also that J0(x) = vTx, it is straightforward to show, under Assumption 2, that:
Claim 2 J0(x) ≤ H(x,u,J0), for all x ∈ S and u ∈ C(x).
Note also that:
Lemma 1 The matrix (I − βA) is non-singular for any β ∈ (0,1).
Proof. Note that, by construction, (I − βA) is strictly diagonally dominant,3 since the magnitude
of its i-th diagonal entry 1 − βθiwii satisﬁes
1 − βθiwii = 1 − βθi(1 −
 
j =i
wij)
= 1 − βθi + β
 
j =i
θiwij > β
 
j =i
θiwij,
i.e., it is strictly larger than the sum of magnitudes of all non-diagonal entries of the ith row. By
Levy-Desplanques theorem (cf., (Horn and Johnson 1985)) the matrix (I − βA) is non-singular.
3A matrix is strictly diagonally dominant if in every row of the matrix, the magnitude of the diagonal entry in that
row is larger than the sum of the magnitudes of all the other (non-diagonal)entries in that row.
16Lemma 2 Let β ∈ (0,1) and A ∈ Rn×n such that (I − βA) is non-singular. Then
˜ Ak =
k  
j=0
β
jA
j = (I − βA)
−1(I − β
k+1A
k+1), (27)
k = 0,1,.... Furthermore, if limk→∞ Ak exists, then ˜ A∞ ,
 ∞
j=0βjAj = (I − βA)−1.
Proof. To show the ﬁrst statement, simply multiply from the left with (I − βA). The second
statement is a direct consequence of (27) if we take the limit as k → ∞.
Deﬁne also: hT
∞ , βvT ˜ A∞B − cT.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Stationary Policy) Consider the inﬁnite horizon optimization problem
(26) under the deterministic and unperturbed dynamics (18). Then, the stationary policy π∗ =
( ∗, ∗,...) ∈ Π, such that  ∗(x) = ( ∗
1, ∗
2,..., ∗
n) with
 
∗
i =
 
M i = argmax
+
1 (h∞)
0 otherwise
(28)
for i ∈ I, is an optimal policy for the inﬁnite horizon optimization problem. Furthermore, the
optimal inﬁnite value is
J
∗ = v
T ˜ A∞x +
M
1 − β
max
+
1 (h∞). (29)
Proof. Due to Claim 2, we have J0(x) ≤ H(x,u,J0) for all x ∈ S and u ∈ C(x). Also, as we
showedin the proof of Proposition3, due to Claim 1 and Assumption2, Jk+1(x) ≥ Jk(x) for every
x ∈ S. Thus, Assumption 4 is satisﬁed and, according to Proposition 2, in order to show that the
stationary policy π∗ = ( ∗, ∗,...) is optimal, it sufﬁces to show that T ∗(Jπ∗) = T(Jπ∗).
First, we compute Jπ∗(x): Similarly to Proposition 3 and taking into account (27), the station-
ary policy π∗ establishes the following sequence of values
JN,π∗ = v
T ˜ ANx +
N−1  
k=0
β
kh
T
N−k 
∗
= v
T ˜ A∞(I − β
N+1A
N+1)x+
N−1  
k=0
β
k
 
βv
T ˜ A∞(I − β
N−kA
N−k)B − c
T
 
 
∗
= v
T ˜ A∞x +
N−1  
k=0
β
kh
T
∞ 
∗ − β
N+1v
T ˜ A∞A
N+1x−
β
N+1v
T ˜ A∞
N−1  
k=0
A
N−kB 
∗.
17Note that
N−1  
k=0
A
N−kB 
∗ =
N  
k=1
A
kB 
∗ =
N  
k=1
W
kΘ
k(I − Θ) 
∗.
Since the diagonal entries of Θ satisfy 0 ≤ θi < 1 for every i ∈ I and  ∗ is bounded, the above
series is convergent. Therefore, we have
Jπ∗ , lim
k→∞
Jk,π∗ = v
T ˜ A∞x +
1
1 − β
h
T
∞ 
∗.
Given  ∗ = ( ∗
1, ∗
2,..., ∗
n) where  ∗
i is given by (28), we have:
h
T
∞ 
∗ = M   max
+
1 (h∞). (30)
Thus,
Jπ∗ = v
T ˜ A∞x +
M
1 − β
max
+
1 (h∞).
We are ready now to compute T ∗(Jπ∗) and T(Jπ∗). In particular,
T ∗(Jπ∗) = g(x, 
∗) + βJπ∗(f(x, 
∗))
= v
T
 
I + β ˜ A∞A
 
x + h
T
∞ 
∗ +
βM
1 − β
max
+
1 (h∞).
Due to condition (30) and the fact that I + β ˜ A∞A ≡ ˜ A∞, we have
T ∗(Jπ∗) = v
T ˜ A∞x +
M
1 − β
max
+
1 (h∞).
Finally,
T(Jπ∗)(x) = max
u∈C(x)
{g(x,u) + βJπ∗(f(x,u))}
= v
T(I + β ˜ A∞A)x + max
u∈C(x)
 
h
T
∞u
 
+
βM
1 − β
max
+
1 (h∞)
= v
T ˜ A∞x + Mmax
+
1 (h∞) +
βM
1 − β
max
+
1 (h∞)
= v
T ˜ A∞x +
M
1 − β
max
+
1 (h∞).
Hence, we showed that T ∗(Jπ∗) = T(Jπ∗), which implies that π∗ is an optimal stationary policy.
Also, Jπ∗ provides the optimal value of the inﬁnite-horizon optimization.
18In other words, according to (28), the ﬁrm is going to invest the largest possible amount M to
the node which corresponds to the maximum entry of
h
T
∞ = βv
T ˜ A∞B − c
T = βv
T(I − βA)
−1(I − Θ) − c
T.
Note that this decision is affected by the following factors:
1. how easily node i can be inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s advertising policy, which is measured by
1 − θi,
2. how large is the “network value” of node i throughout the optimization horizon, expressed
by the ith entry of βvT(I − βA)−1, which measures the effect of every unit of advertising
effort spent in i on the proclivities of all nodes that are connected directly or indirectly to i,
3. how small is the cost of every unit of advertising effort in node i, expressed by ci.
Note also that the matrix (I −βA)−1, which inﬂuences the optimal decision, can be interpreted
as a measure of the centrality of the nodes. In fact, Bonacich in his work on measures of centrality
(Bonacich 1987), introduced the following centrality measure c(γ,β) , γ(I − βA)−1A1, where
γ is a scaling factor. When γ = 1, c(1,β) has several nice interpretations. To see this, note that the
centrality measure, which is equivalently written as c(1,β) = (I+βA+β2A2+...)A1, constitutes
a measure of closeness, since it is high for a node which is connected to other nodes with short
and highly weighted paths. The parameter β represents the degree of information (beneﬁts in our
model) that is transmitted from one node to another node. In our case, where A is a row stochastic
matrix, the above centrality measure takes on the following form
c(1,β) = (I + βA + β
2A
2 + ...)1 = (I − βA)
−11.
In the context of our dynamic model, we can say that c(1,β) represents a measure of the
relative importance of nodes (in terms of beneﬁts) when the initial condition is x0 = 1 and there is
no external inﬂuence (i.e., there is no control input).
Note that in our model both the initial condition and the control input affect the returns of the
advertising ﬁrm. Since we are only interested in the computation of the optimal advertising policy,
an appropriate centrality (or network value) measure would be βvT ˜ A∞B − cT. The highest entry
of this vector will provide the highest beneﬁts over time. Note that when β = 0, the control input
does not have any implication to the returns. In that case, centrality could be measured by vT ˜ A∞,
since it is only the initial condition that affects the returns.
194.2 Perturbed Dynamics
In this section, we are going to consider a family of perturbations of the nominal model (18),
described by
xk+1 = Axk + Bϕ(uk) + Fqk, (31)
where we have neglected the effect of the second ﬁrm. The term qk corresponds to an unknown
signal caused possibly by misspeciﬁed system dynamics. The sequence {qk} may feed back in a
possibly nonlinear way on the history of x. We will impose the following constraint on the size of
any instance of this perturbation sequence:
|qk| ≤ η, for all k = 0,1,..., (32)
where η > 0 is a measure of the ﬁrm’s conﬁdence of the accuracy of the nominal model. Let Q
denote the resulting constraint set of disturbances.
Note that due to the presence of the unknown (but bounded) signal qk our initial assumption
that S ⊂ Rn
+ may be violated. As we noted though in Section 2.3, thesystem is input-outputstable,
thereforean appropriateshiftof thestatecan always guaranteethat thedynamicswill evolvewithin
the positive cone. In particular, consider ¯ x ∈ Rn
+, such that
Fqk + ¯ x ≥ 0, (33)
for all qk satisfying (32), and deﬁne instead the dynamics:
xk+1 = Axk + Bϕ(uk) + Fqk + ¯ x , f(xk,uk,qk). (34)
Note that shifting the dynamics by ¯ x does not change qualitatively the model, since the state x still
describes propensities, but relative to ¯ x.
For some F ∈ Rn×n deﬁne the vector rT
k+1 , βvT ˜ AkF, for k = 0,1,..., with rT
1 = βvTF. Let
also: rT
∞ , βvT ˜ A∞F. We would like to solve the following optimization:
max
π∈Π
min
σ∈Σ
 
J(π,σ)(x0) , lim
N→∞
N−1  
k=0
β
kg(xk, k(xk))
 
, (35)
subject to the perturbed dynamics (34) and the constraints (32)–(33). Here Σ denotes the set of
sequences of policies σ = (ν0,ν1,...) of the uncertainty, where νk is a function from the set of
states S to Q. Note also that due to the new shifted dynamics, a utility function of the form
g(x,u) = vTx − cTu − λ(¯ x) would have been more appropriate. However, in that case, and since
the last term is constant, the optimal policy of (35) would have been identical.
Proposition 5 (Optimal policy under uncertainty) Consider the inﬁnite horizon optimization of
20(35)undertheperturbeddynamics(34)andtheconstraint(32)–(33). Theoptimalstationarypolicy
is  ∗ = ( ∗
1,..., ∗
n), such that
 
∗
i =
 
M i = argmax
+
1 (h∞)
0 otherwise
, i ∈ I. (36)
Proof. To solve this optimization problem, we implement the dynamic programming iteration. In
fact, we recursively implement the operator T( ) deﬁned as
(TJ)(x) , max
u∈C
min
q∈Q
{g(x,u) + βJ(f(x,u,q))}, (37)
for any x ∈ S. The dynamic programming iteration gives:
JN(x) = v
T ˜ ANx +
N−1  
k=0
 
β
kh
T
N−ku
∗
N−k + β
kr
T
N−kq
∗
N−k + β
k+1v
T ˜ AN−k¯ x
 
,
forall N = 1,2,..., where u∗
k and q∗
k denotethesequences of optimalinvestmentsand disturbances,
respectively. In particular, u∗
k = (u∗
1,k,...,u∗
n,k) and q∗
k = (q∗
1,k,...,q∗
n,k), are such that
u
∗
i,k =
 
M i = argmax
+
1 (hk)
0 otherwise
, i ∈ I,
and rT
k q∗
k = −η|rk|∞ . In other words, the disturbance places all its weight on the maximum (in
absolute value) entry of rk, or
q
∗
i,k =
 
−η i = argmax
+
1 (rk)
0 otherwise
, i ∈ I.
The order of max and min in the deﬁnition of the operator T( ) does not change the optimal
policies. Note also that:
H(x,u,q,J0) = g(x,u) + βJ0(f(x,u,q))
= J0(x) + βv
TAx + βv
T(Fq + ¯ x) + (βv
TB − c
T)u
≥ J0(x)
for all x ∈ S, u ∈ C∗, q ∈ Q∗ and under condition (33). Thus, from Proposition 2, the dynamic
programming iteration provides the optimal inﬁnite value.
Consider the stationary policy (36) for the monopolistic ﬁrm and the stationary policy σ∗ =
(ν∗,...,ν∗)forthedisturbancesuchthatrT
∞ν∗ = −η |r∞|∞ .SimilarlytotheproofofProposition4,
21the corresponding inﬁnite value is
J(π∗,σ∗)(x) = v
T ˜ A∞x + h
T
∞ lim
N→∞
N−1  
k=0
β
k 
∗ + r
T
∞ lim
N→∞
N−1  
k=0
β
kν
∗+
βv
T ˜ A∞ lim
N→∞
N−1  
k=0
β
k¯ x
= v
T ˜ A∞x +
1
1 − β
 
Mmax
+
1 (h∞) − η|r∞|∞ + βv
T ˜ A∞¯ x
 
.
By following similar reasoning with the proof of Proposition 4, we can show that
T( ∗,ν∗)(J(π∗,σ∗)) = T(J(π∗,σ∗)).
Therefore, according to Proposition 2, (π∗,σ∗) provides the optimal lower value. It is also straight-
forward to show that the sequence of policies (π∗,σ∗) also provides the optimal upper value, deﬁn-
ing this way a solution to the max-min optimization problem.
Note that the robust optimal policy for the perturbed model coincides with the optimal policy
for the unperturbed or riskless model, i.e., it exhibits a certainty equivalence property.
5 Optimal Policy in Duopoly
5.1 Preliminaries
Theprevioussection computedtheoptimalrobustpolicyfortheproblemofmonopolyundernorm-
bounded model uncertainty. In this section, we would also like to include the possibility that a
competitiveﬁrm tries to inﬂuence the preferences of the customers towards buying its own product
as described by the more general duopoly model (4).
The presence of a competitive ﬁrm introduces a new source of uncertainty. We will either
assume that i) the competitive ﬁrm has the form of a competitive fringe which tries to enter the
market, introducing a notion of sequential optimization (expressed by a Stackelberg solution), or
ii) both ﬁrms have the ability of simultaneous play (expressed by a Nash solution).
Each ﬁrm ℓ ∈ L solves the following optimization problem:
max
πℓ∈Πℓ
 
J(πℓ,π−ℓ)(x
ℓ
0) , lim
N→∞
N−1  
k=0
β
kg
 
x
ℓ
k, 
ℓ
k(x
ℓ
k)
 
 
(38)
subject to the system dynamics
x
ℓ
k+1 = Ax
ℓ
k + Bϕ( 
ℓ
k, 
−ℓ
k ) (39)
22where πℓ = ( ℓ
1, ℓ
2,...) and π−ℓ = ( 
−ℓ
1 , 
−ℓ
2 ,...) are the inﬁnite sequences of policies of the ﬁrms
ℓ and −ℓ, respectively.
Deﬁnition 1 (Stackelberg solution) A Stackelberg solution is a pair of policies (πℓ∗,π−ℓ∗) ∈
Πℓ × Π−ℓ such that
π
−ℓ∗ ∈ BR−ℓ(π
ℓ∗) , argmax
π−ℓ
 
J(π−ℓ,πℓ)(x
−ℓ
0 )
 
 π
ℓ∗ 
and, πℓ∗ ∈ argmaxπℓ∈Πℓ
 
J(πℓ,π−ℓ)(xℓ
0)
 
 π−ℓ ∈ BR−ℓ(πℓ)
 
.
In the above deﬁnition of a Stackelberg solution, we will refer to ﬁrm ℓ as the leader and ﬁrm
−ℓ as the follower. Note that the deﬁnition implies that ﬁrm ℓ (or leader) announces ﬁrst its policy,
while ﬁrm −ℓ (or follower) reacts to that policy.
Deﬁnition 2 (Nash solution) A pair of policies (πℓ∗,π−ℓ∗) ∈ Πℓ × Π−ℓ is a Nash solution if
π−ℓ∗ ∈ BR−ℓ(πℓ∗) and πℓ∗ ∈ BRℓ(π−ℓ∗).
We will also refer to these solutions as Markovian or closed-loop Nash solutions. If, instead, the
maximization in the deﬁnition of the Nash solution is restricted to the set of sequences of control
inputs in Cℓ, then the corresponding solutions will be referred to as open-loop Nash solutions.
Note that these deﬁnitions of Nash solutions implicitly assumes a simultaneous announcement of
policies for both ﬁrms.
A straightforward implication of the above deﬁnitions is that any Stackelberg solution is also a
Nash solution.
5.2 Open-loop stationary Nash solutions
In this section, we will restrict our attention to open-loop Nash solutions that are also stationary,
i.e., time-independent. Before characterizing this familyof Nash solutions, deﬁne theset ofactions
Aℓ , {α1,α2,...,αn}, ℓ ∈ L, such that for each i ∈ {1,2,...,n}, αi = (αi,1,αi,2,...,αi,n) where
αi,j ,
 
M j = argmax
+
i (h∞),
0 otherwise,
j = 1,2,...,n.
In other words, the action αi corresponds to investing all available funds to the ith largest non-
negative entry of h∞. Note that the set of actions deﬁne an isomorphic set of stationary policies,
i.e., for each action αi there is a stationary policy (αi,αi,...). Let us also denote by J(i,j)(x) the
corresponding inﬁnite horizon value for initial condition x when one ﬁrm applies stationary policy
23(αi,αi,...) and the other ﬁrm applies (αj,αj,...). Any other open-loop stationary policy  ℓ can be
represented as a mixture of actions in Aℓ, i.e.,
 
ℓ =

  
  
α1, with probability pℓ
1
...
αn, with probability pℓ
n
, ℓ ∈ L, (40)
where pℓ
i ≥ 0, i ∈ I, and
 
i pℓ
i = 1. The corresponding value of the objective function (38) for
any open-loop stationary policy is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Payoffs under open-loop policies) When both ﬁrms ℓ ∈ L apply an open-loop
stationary policy πℓ = ( ℓ, ℓ,...) satisfying (40), the inﬁnite value of the objective function
J(πℓ,π−ℓ) deﬁned by (38), is J(πℓ,π−ℓ) =
 
i∈I
 
j∈I J(i,j)pℓ
ip
−ℓ
j , where
J(i,j)(x) =
 
vT ˜ A∞x + 1
1−β[−cTαi], i = j
vT ˜ A∞x +
1
1−β[hT
∞αi], i  = j
,x ∈ S
ℓ,ℓ ∈ L. (41)
Proof. When the pair of stationary policies (πℓ,π−ℓ) is applied, where πℓ = ( ℓ, ℓ,...) and
π−ℓ = ( −ℓ, −ℓ,...), the corresponding value of the objective function of ﬁrm ℓ will be:
J(πℓ,π−ℓ)(x) = v
T ˜ A∞x + lim
N→∞
N−1  
k=0
β
k  
(h∞ + c)
Tϕ
 
 
ℓ(x), 
−ℓ(x)
 
− c
T 
ℓ(x)
 
= v
T ˜ A∞x +
1
1 − β
 
(h∞ + c)
Tϕ
 
 
ℓ(x), 
−ℓ(x)
 
− c
T 
ℓ(x)
 
for some initial state x ∈ Sℓ. If  ℓ =  −ℓ = αi, then the corresponding inﬁnite value of the
objective function of ℓ, denoted J(i,i), is:
J(i,i)(x) = v
T ˜ A∞x +
1
1 − β
[−c
Tαi].
If, instead,  ℓ = αi and  −ℓ = αj, i  = j, the corresponding inﬁnite value of the objective function
ℓ, denoted J(i,j), is:
J(i,j)(x) = v
T ˜ A∞x +
1
1 − β
[h
T
∞αi].
Then, the corresponding expected return of ﬁrm ℓ ∈ L is:
J(πℓ,π−ℓ)(x) = v
T ˜ A∞x +
 
i,j∈I
 
(h∞ + c)Tϕ(αi,αj) − cTαi
 
1 − β
p
ℓ
ip
−ℓ
j
24=
 
i,j∈I
 
v
T ˜ A∞x +
 
(h∞ + c)Tϕ(αi,αj) − cTαi
 
1 − β
 
p
ℓ
ip
−ℓ
j
=
 
i,j∈I
J(i,j)p
ℓ
ip
−ℓ
j ,
which concludes the proof.
Thus, we may deﬁne an equivalent one-stage symmetric game of two players, ﬁnite set of
actions Aℓ = {α1,α2,...,αn} for each player ℓ ∈ L, and payoff matrix of the row player which is
given by Table 1.
α1 α2 ... αn
α1 J(1,1) J(1,2) ... J(1,n)
α2 J(2,1) J(2,2) ... J(2,n)
... ... ... ... ...
αn J(n,1) J(n,2) ... J(n,n)
Table 1: Equivalent one-shot symmetric game in open-loop stationary policies.
A direct consequence of Proposition 6 is the following:
Lemma 3 The following hold:
1. J(i,j)(x) ≥ J(i,i)(x) for all i,j ∈ I with i  = j;
2. J(i,j)(x) = J(i,j′)(x) for all i,j,j′ ∈ I with j  = i and j′  = i;
3. J(i,j)(x) ≥ J(j,i)(x) for all i,j ∈ I with i > j.
Proposition 7 (Stackelberg & Nash solutions) Let usconsidertheoptimizationproblem(38)un-
der the dynamics (39) and the constraints (1) with Mℓ = M−ℓ, i.e., both ﬁrms have identical ad-
vertising power. For any ℓ ∈ L, the pair of open-loop stationary policies π∗ = (πℓ∗,π−ℓ∗) where
πℓ∗ = ( ℓ∗, ℓ∗,...) and  ℓ is deﬁned by (40) satisfying either
(1) pℓ
1 = p
−ℓ
2 = 1, or
(2) pℓ
1 = p
−ℓ
2 =
J(1,2)−J(2,2)
J(1,2)−J(1,1)+J(2,1)−J(2,2),
deﬁnes an open-loop Nash solution. Furthermore, when ℓ ∈ L has the opportunity to announce its
policy ﬁrst, the open-loop stationary policy corresponding to (1) deﬁnes an open-loop Stackelberg
solution.
25Proof. The ﬁrst claim is a direct consequence of Lemma 3 and the fact that any one of the poli-
cies corresponding to the cases (1) and (2) deﬁnes a Nash solution for the equivalent one-shot
symmetric game of Table 1.
Assume now that ℓ has the opportunity to announce its strategy ﬁrst. In order to show that
(πℓ∗,π−ℓ∗) deﬁnes a Stackelberg solution, we need to verify that the leader’s policy πℓ∗ guaran-
tees maximum return over all possible announced policies. It is straightforward to show that any
announced policy that does not allocate all available funds to argmax
+
1 (h∞) will result to a best
response of the follower that decreases leader’s utility.
The conclusions of Proposition 7 do not necessarily hold when we consider different spending
powers for the ﬁrms, i.e., when Mℓ  = M−ℓ. However, extending the conclusions of Proposition 7
to that case is straightforward.
Another straightforward implication of Proposition 7 is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The open-loop stationary Nash solutions characterized by Proposition 7 are also
closed-loop Nash solutions.
This is due to the fact that open-loop strategies are a subset of Markovian or state-dependent
strategies. A complete characterization of the set of closed-loop Nash solutions is going beyond
the scope of this paper, since it is highly case-dependent, i.e., it depends on the class of policies
which will be considered reasonable for the application of interest. For example, if we assume that
the class of strategies over which the optimization is executed are afﬁne functions of the state, then
a new class of closed loop Nash solutions can easily be computed using the framework proposed
in this paper.
5.3 Max-min solutions
Computing an optimal strategy which is robust to any possible policy of the competitor can be
formulated as a max-min optimization. Consider two ﬁrms with different expenditure capabilities.
In particular, consider the following two scenarios: a) Mℓ > M−ℓ, and b) Mℓ ≤ M−ℓ for any
ℓ ∈ L. Then, ﬁrm ℓ ∈ {a,b} solves the following max-min optimization:
max
π∈Π
min
σ∈Σ
 
J(π,σ)(x0) , lim
N→∞
N−1  
k=0
β
kg (xk, k(xk))
 
(42)
over the set Π of inﬁnite sequences of policies ( 0, 1,...) and subject to the system dynamics
xk+1 = Axk + Bϕ( k,νk). (43)
26The set Σ denotes the collection of inﬁnite sequences of policies (ν0,ν1,...) of the competitor. In
words, the above optimizationreﬂects the situation at which the ﬁrm wishes to announce a strategy
which will providethe optimal returns assuming that the competitoracts to minimizethese returns.
To simplify notation, we have removed the superscript ℓ from the above optimization variables. It
is straightforward to show that:
Proposition 8 Let us consider the optimization problem (42) under the dynamics (43) and the
constraints (1). If Mℓ > M−ℓ, i.e., the advertising power of the ﬁrm ℓ is larger than the one of its
competitor, then the optimal strategy of the ﬁrm will be a stationary policy ( ∗, ∗,...) such that
 
∗
i =
 
M i = argmax
+
1 (h∞)
0 otherwise
, i ∈ I. (44)
Note that this is not necessarily the case when the advertising power of the ﬁrm is less than
the competitor’s. In that case, any strategy will be optimal, since the competitor has the power to
counteract any announced strategy of the ﬁrm.
6 Conclusions
We discussed the problem of deriving optimal advertising strategies in a network of customers or
groups of customers. Contrary to prior work, the dynamics of preferences were also affected by
an underlying network of interactions which introduces a form of word-of-mouth communication
between nodes. The derived optimal policies are related to and extend priorly introduced notions
of centrality measures usually considered in sociology. Although the assumed model of evolution
of preferences might be the outcome of an identiﬁcation process, it is likely that we are uncer-
tain about its accuracy. To this end, we also considered a perturbed model which models possible
misspeciﬁcations or uncertainties of the nominal model, and we derived robust optimal strategies.
It was shown that the monopoly model exhibits a certainty equivalence property, i.e., the optimal
strategies for the perturbed model coincide with the optimal strategies for the unperturbed or risk-
less model. Finally, we investigated robust policies in a duopoly framework. In particular, we
characterized the set of open-loop Nash solutions. The model can easily be utilized to accommo-
date scenarios at which more complicated forms of strategies are of interest, leading to new forms
of closed-loop Nash solutions. We also characterized the set of max-min solutions in a duopoly
framework, when ﬁrms makes no assumptions about the utilities of the competitor.
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